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Abstract 
The article analyzes the domestic dynamics of the political systems of the late Ottoman 
Empire and Khedival and British Egypt, aiming to determine the causes of 
radicalization of the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers (MB) and the Turkish 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) as political parties in a comparative 
perspective. The study demonstrates that the nature of the two groups was determined 
by the constraints imposed by the political system upon party development. Constructed 
on the basis of the first predominant ideological cleavage, the political system and its 
actors were in turn shaped by the degree of penetration of foreign pressures into 
domestic politics. The first section of the article focuses on the impact of foreign 
pressures on the institutionalization of political cleavages, by examining modernizing 
reforms’ trajectories and elite development. The second section analyzes the CUP and 
the MB as emergent externally created parties originating from the synthesis of 
intrasocietal and extrasocietal dimensions of the political systems in which they 
emerged.  
 
Keywords: The Committee of Union and Progress, The Society of the Muslim 
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The Middle East and North Africa region has been bypassed by the 
third wave of democratization and the post-Cold War spread of democratic 
institutions. If academic curiosities grew into significant policy dilemmas after 
the 9/11 attacks, the Arab Spring has brought into the spotlight the ongoing 
unrest resulted from the relation between states, political actors and civil 
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society. The consequent rise of political Islamism has challenged the 
authoritarian status quo, exposing “the failures of the mechanisms and channels 
through which state institutions have traditionally been controlled and the 
political trajectory of the state effected”1.  
Archetypes of political participation, political cleavages have been 
gradually decanting into incipient political parties since the second half of the 
XIXth century. The capacity of political groups to aggregate political 
representation in the region expanded and witnessed mutations after the First 
World War, due to of above imposed political regimes and everlasting 
authoritarianism. As the region’s prospects for democratization have been 
shattered by violence and oppression, the prerequisites that led to the 
radicalization of Islamist political groups should be understood as the 
convergence of various patterns of political mobilization and authoritarianism. 
If political systems and political parties are directly affected by the historical 
circumstances shaping the environment in which they commence, then a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of political actors in MENA requires 
a special attention to the early stages of political participation. The article is 
concerned with understanding the institutionalization of political cleavages in 
the caucus and mass party eras as framework of analysis for two political 
groups with divergent ideologies, that radicalized in opposition: the Turkish 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Society of the Muslim 
Brothers in Egypt (MB).  
The first part of the study focuses on the impact of foreign pressures on the 
institutionalization of political cleavages, by examining modernizing reforms’ 
trajectories and elite development. The second section analyses the two political 
groups as emergent externally created parties. The goal of the article is to prove 
that the configuration of political systems determined the ideological orientation 
and radicalization of the two groups. If the CUP and the Egyptian MB were 
radical mass political parties that had similar positions in the political system, 
similar organizational structures and radical, yet opposite ideological 
orientations, then their nature is a result of the configuration of intrasocietal and 
extrasocietal dimensions of the political systems.  
 
 
The Model 
 
The model assumes “violence flows from efforts of social or functional 
classes to maintain or improve their positions relative to others”3, resembling 
                                                 
1 Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi and Lauren Banko, “Introduction 
to political parties in the Middle East: historical trajectories and future prospects”, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol .44, No. 2, 2017, p.156. 
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group conflict theory. Mixing internal social dynamics and external pressures in 
a similar fashion to David Easton’s depiction of the intrasocietal and 
extrasocietal dimensions of political systems, Theda Skocpol’s correlation 
between the incapacity of the state to perform its functions and state crisis 
provides three levels of analysis. These are the failure of the state to 
institutionalize inclusive political competition, the emergence of significant 
marginal elites manifesting themselves as intellectual movements and the 
incapacity of the state to exercise diplomatic representation and individual 
foreign policy.  
Firstly, Skocpol’s combination of Marxist and Weberian traditionalism 
indicates that the political system cannot separate itself from the web of power 
relationships operating at the level of society. Secondly, she accounts the 
importance of the world system’s pressures in shaping group dynamics at 
domestic level: by failing to exercise foreign policy, the pressures of the 
international world system are not filtered by the state, hence generating 
mutations in the development of domestic politics. Thirdly, the failure of the 
state to act as a non-ideological implementer of the social contract can 
determine the emergence and ideological orientation of marginal elites.  
As the analysis focuses on patterns of ideological cleavage formation in 
the center of an Empire and a province struggling for autonomy, the validity of 
the unit of analysis is based on deprioritizing the state. Because the study looks 
at the pre-caucus, caucus and mass-party eras of representation in MENA, the 
conceptual representation of the administrative body defining the space of 
domestic politics cannot be equated with the definition of the state, which is the 
de facto expression of modernity. Hence, the domestic political arena is not 
delimited by sovereignty, but, resembling Easton’s model2. Thus, it is defined 
as an organized political community encompassing all individuals, social 
groups, institutions and interactions among them, which function in a regulated 
or irregulated setting and whom connect and relate to each other, without 
assimilating inputs from the international arena through a formal system.  
Viewing the state as a partaker instead of a regulator transforms the 
latter in one of the groups engaged in competition, conflict and cooperation for 
                                                 
2
  According to David Easton, the system of analysis comprises the intrasocietal and 
extrasocietal environment; the intrasocietal environment consists of “those systems in the 
society as the political system which are not political systems due to our definition of the 
nature of political interactions. Intrasocietal systems include such sets of behavior, 
attitudes, and ideas as the economy, culture, social structure and personalities; they are 
functional segments of the society which the political system is itself a component […]. 
The extrasocietal includes all those systems that lie outside the given society itself. They 
are functional components of all international society, a suprasystem of which any single 
society is part. […] Taken together, these two classes of systems comprise the total 
environment of political system.” (David Easton, Varieties of political theory, Prentice-
Hall, USA, 1966). 
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maintaining or acquiring the control of the mechanisms mirroring a modern 
state.  Similarly, Peter Mair depicts that “political parties are the agencies 
through which groups, and thus their members, participate in politics, make 
demands on the state, and ultimately attempt to capture control of the state”3.   
Theories of political parties/party systems represent the foundation for 
the analysis of internal social dynamics or the intrasocietal system. Having at 
its core historical context, the model is based on the argument that the 
circumstances under which political parties arise in a developing political 
system are the determinants of the nature of the political parties which 
subsequently emerge. Consequently, Katz and Mair argue that “the factors 
facilitating this dialectic do not derive solely from changes in the civil society, 
but also from changes in the relations between parties and the state”4 (the graphic 
representation of this theory accounts the position of the political party in relation to 
the state and the civil society, as represented in the Figure 1, 2 and 3). 
The model omits both the institutionalization of the groups analyzed as 
political parties and the state’s modern identity and functions, allowing an 
approach resembling group conflict theory in tackling the relation between 
them, by applying a party system rationale. The work of Arend Lijphart and 
Stein Rokkan represent the foundation for understanding political system 
structure and cleavage. Whereas Arda Can Kumbaracibasi’s approach on the 
study of political institutionalization of the AKP5 leadership was used as source 
of inspiration for tackling the reign of Abdülhamid the IInd, by adapting Angelo 
Panebianco’s “trade-off” model - a dilemma of leadership where one dimension 
of the political group needs to be traded-off to enhance the other.                   
 
 
The Impact of Foreign Policy 
on Modernizing Reform 
 
Modernizing transitions are greatly influenced by “reciprocal 
relationships between social units”6. Mixing Barrington Moore’s analysis of 
class relationships along the course of social change and Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s international world system, Skocpol considers society by default 
international, arguing its dynamics cannot be understood without considering 
                                                 
3
  Peter Mair, Party System Change Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1997, p.94. 
4
  Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, in Party Politics, Vol.1. No.1 pp. 5 – 28, 
2005, p.6.  
5
  Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/The Justice and Development Party in Turkey.  
6
  Immanuel Wallerstein, World System Analysis – An Introduction, Duke University Press, 
Durham and London, 2004. 
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international factors. Furthermore, by understanding foreign induced pressures 
in terms of military competition between political entities placed on different 
locations within the world system, political systems can be defined as “a system 
of behavior imbedded in an environment to the influences of which the political 
system itself is exposed and in turn reacts”7. By assuming that the exercise of 
sovereign foreign policy is a determinant in the development of domestic 
politics, the following section looks at the nature and impact of foreign policy 
on modernizing reform in the late Ottoman Empire and Colonial Egypt.  
In the XIXth century Ottoman Empire debates on how to modernize the 
nation and make the army powerful again sprung concomitantly with the 
decline of the Empire. Seeking solutions for its revival while facing strong 
foreign adversaries paved the way for elite modernization and renewal. In the 
XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries “the Ottoman rulers looked at the indigenous 
solutions8” and believed they could limit their “reform-imports” to Western 
technology, keeping a distance from cultural aspects. This proved impossible, 
the Ottomans facing, by the end of the XVIIIth century, the need to transplant 
institutions, political and even philosophical infrastructure from the West. 
Two outcomes of direct foreign pressures facilitated the progress of 
future representation within domestic politics in the central administration of the 
Empire. One is that all major reforms of the XIXth century could be accounted 
as reactions to the decline of the Empire. The other one underlines that the 
necessity of strategic diplomatic representation triggered a developmental 
process within the ruling class. The Tanzimat can be considered a result of the 
decline of the Empire – if the army needed to be strengthened, the financial 
system needed to be reformed to provide new resources; the acute necessity of 
keeping up with its direct competitors on the world scene triggered the need of 
new specialists in all fields of activity. Since the Karlowitz Peace Treaty of 
1699, the international world system pressures became more and more vivid for 
the Ottomans. The disastrous Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca concluding the 
Russian-Turkish War of 1768-74 and launching the “Eastern Question”, 
brought “the Russians to the Black Sea and put them into a position where they 
could take the Crimea and intervene in the Principalities”9. Equally, the 
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt (1798) stimulated the demands to end political 
decentralization in the Empire and to reassert Sultanic authority. Sultan Selim 
III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) responded with reforms that laid 
                                                 
7
  David Easton, Varieties of political theory … cit., p.2. 
8
  Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz _12September_Turkey's Current Challenges in Foreign Policy & 
Domestic Issues; [video  file];  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pa1YabaAdM>,  
consuled  at Sept. 20, 2015. 
9
  Stanford J. Shaw, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: Niẓām-ı Cedīdi Army of 
Sultan Selim III, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 37, No. 3, September 1965, The 
University of Chicago Press, p.291.  
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the basis for the Tanzimat. 
Was the Ottoman Empire a dormant society revived by the European 
Enlightenment? In constant territorial retreat since the Siege of Vienna, the 
beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s decline could be equated with Sultan 
Suleiman the Magnificent’s death, in 1566. However, the legitimacy of the 
Ottoman Empire remained intact, even during the rebellions against the Sultan. 
The general opinion among scholars holds that Ottomans took little interests 
beyond their borders except when they were likely to affect them, creating the 
episode during which the French revolutionary forces occupied the Eastern 
Mediterranean as the leading cause for the “westernization” of the Empire 
through reform. Thus, the Napoleonic phase was a key to a new period of rapid 
change, “one that added a quantum leap forward to an ongoing process”10. 
Some scholars also argue “reforms were already taking place in 1793, at least in 
the field of gathering intelligence, [indicating] fundamental change in the 
psyche of the Ottoman political order”11. 
The process of introducing new European technologies did not occur 
sharply at the beginning of the period labeled as the Tanzimat, but since the 
Niẓām-ı Cedīdi. Described in literature as a “vigilant reformist who had a plan 
to reform the decaying institutions of the Empire even before his accession […] 
Selim III is usually glorified as an early champion of westernizing 
institutions”12. As far as he was concerned, “the Empire was in difficulty 
because the traditional institutions were not being operated properly” 13. Sultan 
Selim III’s agenda shifted significantly to military reforms beginning with 1792, 
when he became concerned with improving the quality of military equipment, 
introducing by 1793 contemporary European technologies to manufacture 
cannons, rifles, mines and gunpowder.  
Since a political system is “imbedded in an environment and subject to 
possible environmental influences that threaten to drive the essential variables 
of the system beyond their critical range”14, reforms introduced within the 
military triggered multi-dimensional reform within the Empire. Therefore, in 
Weberian terms, the New Order marked “the beginnings of the transition from 
                                                 
10
  Dror Ze’evi, “Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the 
Middle East” in Mediterranean Historical Review, Volume 19, June 2014, p. 86. 
11
  Fatih Yesil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman eyes: Ebubekir Ratib 
Efendi‘s observations” in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London , Vol. 70, No. 2, 2007, Cambridge University Press, p. 283. 
12
  Betül Başaran, Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the 
Eighteenth Century:  Between Crisis and Order, Brill, Leiden, Netheralnds, 2014, p.75.  
13
   Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I Empire 
of the Gazis- The   Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, 
Cambridge University Press, USA, 1976, p.260. 
14
  David Easton, Varieties of political theory … cit., p.150. 
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‘traditional’ towards ‘rational-legal’ authority”15. To finance the new order16, 
Selim set up a new treasury and transformed the existing School of 
Mathematics into the military Land Engineering School and Naval Engineering 
School: “if Liberal ideas were introduced in economics, they would have to be 
introduced in politics as well”17, bringing about an acceptance on the Sultans’ 
behalf that non-Muslim subjects would establish their own community 
schools18. Attention was now given to printing and to the circulation of Western 
translations, and young Turks were sent to Europe to study. Modernity required 
“increased access to information, domestically on the Empire and externally 
abroad, therefore an advisory council of experts”19 was established, putting the 
basis of the future Turkish foreign ministry20. The European industrial revolution 
added up to Küçük Kaynarca, Jossi and to the Ottoman-British commercial 
treaty of 1839, “adversely affecting the Empire in the XIXth century and being 
instrumental in its final collapse” 21. While the eastwards flow of European goods 
increased significantly by the end of the first quarter of the XIXth century, the 
extensive and costly Ottoman industrial efforts of the 1840s “have been dismissed 
as the casual if not comical games of disinterested bureaucrats” 22 . 
Defence depended of diplomacy, as the Sultan was faced with finding a 
strategy against intruders from outside based on signals of possession, since 
physical attacks on foreign organisms were avoidable23. The necessity of 
                                                 
15
  Carter Vaughn Findley, “The Tanzimat”, Resat Kasaba (ed.), The Cambridge History of 
Turkey, Volume 4 - Turkey in The Modern World, Cambridge University Press, USA, 
2008, pp.11-37, p.12. 
16
  Three views aiming to cure the empire from its weaknesses by reforming the army 
emerged: (1) totally reverting to earlier military methods; (2) merging the old with the 
new – Eu ropean techniques; (3) radical eradication of the old structures and replacing 
them with the new. Selim tried to opt for the second approach, but the Jannaiseries 
opposed his reform efforts (the introduction of new organizations, tactics and weapons) 
Thus, Selim saw himself in the position of establishing a new infantry unit trained and 
equipped in accordance to European standards.  (Fatma Muge Gocek, Denial of Violence: 
Ottoman Past, Turkish  Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789-
2009, Oxford University Press, USA, 2014, p.84). 
17
  Carter Vaughn Findley, “The Tanzimat… cit”., p.13. 
18
  The Empire witnessed a fast multiplication of community schools for non-Muslims.  
19
  Fatma Muge Gocek, Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past …cit., p.85. 
20
  Although none of the two institutions survived Selim III’s rule, they laid the foundations 
for the future Tanzimat, since those trained within them formed “the seeds of the 
reformist officials and officers who eventually dictated the course of modernity first in the 
empire and later in the republic” (Fatma Muge Gocek, Denial of Violence: Ottoman 
Past …cit., p.84). 
21
  Edward C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution” in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan. 1974, Cambridge University Press, p.65. 
22
  Edward C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution… cit”., p.65. 
23  Peter Flora, Stein Kuhlne, Derek Urwin (ed), State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass 
Politics in Europe - The Theory of Stein Rokkan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, 
p.109. 
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constructing comprehensive foreign policy demonstrated the importance of civil 
elites, especially diplomats, who became influential also in domestic politics. 
The Tanzimat represented a period of “continuation and intensification of 
reform” 24. In reaction to the intensifying foreign pressures that the Empire had 
to respond to, Ottoman rulers became more aware of the need of international 
civil cooperation for the survival of the Empire.  
While the Porte was struggling to respond to the domestic issues within 
its Millet system, the destabilizing wave within its borders turned into an 
opportunity for other foreign powerful actors to act against it. Ever since the 
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, the European powers seized momentum to 
intervene in the regions that were under the control of the Ottoman Empire. 
Although Egypt remained under Ottoman domination officially until 1914, by 
1840 the region witnessed a series of local crises that marked the politicization 
of religious and ethnic differences, to which the declining Empire could not 
respond anymore, exclusively, by military means. 
Although “Abdülhamid’s use of Islam and his attempts to raise the 
hopes of Ottoman Muslims have been received with hostility by Europeans”25, 
his rule witnessed an important spring of modernization. While the place 
occupied by him in the modernization history of the Empire is contested by 
some historians whom criticized his authoritarianism, if modernization does 
breed revolution26, facts prove otherwise.  During his rule, Abdülhamid showed 
the deepening importance of foreign policy for the development of the domestic 
political arena. The complicated situation in the midst of which Abdülhamid 
acceded to throne27 reinforced his anxieties: the Empire was unable to meet its 
obligations in concerning its foreign debt, the growing nationalist feelings in the 
Balkans were complicating the international relations of the Eastern Question, 
while the Great Powers of the time were showing signs of changing agendas. 
While Britain became increasingly interested in the Suez Canal, the Ottomans 
witnessed Russian involvement in the Balkans. Forced to sign a humiliating 
peace at San Stefano, Abdülhamid’s “main objectives were preserving peace 
[and] developing a strategic plan to cope with the threats represented by the 
                                                 
24
  Edward C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution … cit”., p.65. 
25
  Benjamin C. Fortna, “The reign of Abdulhamid II”, Resat Kasaba (ed.) The Cambridge 
History of Turkey, Volume 4 - Turkey in The Modern World, Cambridge University Press, 
USA, 2008, pp. 38 – 61, p.40. 
26
  Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?”, in Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change, April 1973.  
27
  The Balkans were effervescent and inflamed by Tsarist Russia, while Britain was losing 
its counterweight to Russia’s status in the eyes of the Ottomans. After a coup carried out 
by various high-ranking officials against Abdülhamid’s uncle and Murad Vth’s incapacity 
to continue ruling, Abdülhamid acceded to throne and faced himself two coups d‘état s in 
the first years of his ruling. 
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various interests of the Great Powers” 28. Whereas Crete and Lebanon were 
sinking into crisis, the penetration of Europeans increased; the 1848 nationalist 
uprisings in the Balkans and the 1856 Crimean War outcomes that culminated 
with the 1877 war, gave the Tsarist Empire the opportunity to claim protectorate 
of Orthodoxy, deepening the breach in Ottoman sovereignty. The purpose of the 
Gülhane Edict, which is considered to mark the beginning of the Tanzimat, can 
be defined as means to “prevent European States from intervening in internal 
affairs of the Ottoman State, while providing closeness with European States 
and saving the State from regression by taking help from them in the Mehmed 
Ali Pasha Rebellion”29. 
The gradual increase of the importance of diplomacy triggered the 
development of civilian elites: Mustafa Reşid, Kececizad Fuad and Mehmed 
Emin Ali, whom served both as foreign ministers and Grand Visers, came to 
shape the period. Mustafa Reşid Pasa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 
time was to author The Hatti-i Şerif of Gulhane, the document that steered 
officially the period of the Tanzimat, on November third, 1839, shortly after the 
death of Sultan Mahmud II.  
If domestic politics was a matter of foreign politics for the Turkish 
elites, foreign politics was accounted in Egypt in terms of domestic politics; 
however, assessing the impact of Ottoman dominance in Egypt’s political 
participation’s future is challenging, because the role played by both the state 
and elites changes. In both Mamluk Egypt and Egypt under the Ali dynasty, the 
ruling elites were actively involved in creating cultural models: it was the elites 
whom introduced in the XIXth century western cultural models, as it happened 
in future Turkey. Yet, conditions were different in Ottoman Egypt: “the role of 
the state and elites underwent an important change, resulting in a dislocation of 
some of its structures”30. Egypt moved from being the center of an Empire to a 
province – the complex bureaucratic structure of the XVth century was reduced, 
Ottomanization being applied mainly in administration, which proved to be the 
core of modernizing reform in future Turkey. By lacking its own administration, 
the reforming process that led to the renewal of the elite class in Istanbul did not 
take place in Cairo, because Egypt was led by Ottoman bureaucrats. 
Furthermore, if in the case of the Empire defense depended on diplomacy, in the 
case of late Ottoman Egypt defense depended directly on maintaining the 
monopoly on the use of force. While the central actors in Istanbul were already 
struggling to find non-confrontational solutions for the decline of the Empire in 
                                                 
28
  Benjamin c. Fortna, “The reign of Abdulhamid II …cit”., p.47. 
29
  Zabit Acer, “Ottoman Modernization and Effects pf the Tanzimat Edict Today” in Ozean 
Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2009, p.190. 
30
  Sukru Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918”, Resat Kasaba (ed.), 
The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 4 - Turkey in The Modern World, Cambridge 
University Press, USA, 2008, pp. 62 – 111, p.88. 
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the face of foreign threat, Egypt continued its violent struggle towards autonomy. 
The Ottoman central government had already lost its ability to direct 
affairs of Egypt in the XVIIth century, by losing control over the leading 
positions in the administration and the garrison corps. Soon, its remaining 
representatives could not stop the locals from penetrating the institutions in 
Egypt. Without the power to control locally based military households, the 
central government in Istanbul resorted to sending Ottoman governors in Egypt 
with secret orders to bring down locals that dominated the military and the 
financial life.As a result, by the time Muhammad Ali's seizure of power ended a 
long three-way civil war between the Ottoman Turks, Egyptian Mamluks, and 
Albanian mercenaries (1803 - 1807), the necessity of a military ruling class 
became imminent: a power group arose in Ottoman Egypt because of the 
faceoff between two institutions of military slavery: the Mamluk and the 
Ottoman. Accordingly, “this slave-recruited manpower was the backbone of the 
army, and of the administration”31, was isolated from the surrounding society 
and was considered a force to be reckoned with in the early XIXh century. 
Having fought against Napoleon’s forces and the Ottomans, the warrior-nobles 
standing as Egyptian local elites made their presence in the region felt – by the 
second half of the XVIIth century the Mamluk leaders “did not fear to assassinate 
governors or to refuse them entry into Cairo, but rather assumed themselves the 
executive powers of the absent governor”32. Because of the lack of conducting 
diplomatic endeavors, the elite de-militarization process that sprung by the time the 
Jannasaires were abolished in Istanbul, was impeded in Egypt. 
 
 
Reform: Degree of Autonomy and Class Circulation 
 
Influenced partly by the existence or lack of foreign policy, the impact of 
domestic policies on elite-development was to trigger divergent developments of 
incipient participation. If the Tanzimat was a period of gradual liberalization of the 
political arena in the center of the Empire, in the case of Egypt, the XIXth century 
Muhammad Ali dynasty’s rule was to bring about the opposite. 
The Gülhane Imperial Edict (1839) is considered by most historians a 
mark of the unfolding and intensification of reform at the core of the Empire - 
calling for reforms in taxation, military recruitment procedures and judicial 
procedure, it proved to be “less of a westernizing measure that has commonly 
                                                 
31
  Gabriel Piterberg, “The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the 18th Century” in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies”, Vol. 22, No. 3, August 1990, Cambridge 
University Press, p.275. 
32
  Daniel Cercelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, M.W Daly (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth 
Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008, p.61. 
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been assumed”33. However, it set forth the principles “that allowed effective 
executive and legislative power to pass from the monarch to the bureaucracy 
and representative bodies34, laying the foundation for “an appropriate balance 
between nobility and monarchic power”35, which for Moore stands as a 
precondition required for a society to develop into a liberal constitutional and 
democratic political regime.  
While in future Turkey elites were on the road towards acquiring 
autonomy, Muhammad Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, managed to “end Mamluk 
power and to create a loyal elite composed of members of his own family, of 
friends and acquaintances and of members of the expanding bureaucracy that he 
founded”36. A new ruling class arose isolated from the realities of the civil 
society and served exclusively the ruler’s purpose in both domestic and foreign 
politics: to tighten his grip on power. In contrast, the Gülhane cancelled the 
arbitrary punishments of the Sultan that elites were subject of during the rule of 
Selim IIIrd and Mahmud II, allowing elites to acquire a form of autonomy, by 
giving them the space to act independently from the monarch in the incipient 
phase of the caucus representation progression. The provision also motivated 
the ruling elite to act independently in order to keep the decree in force. 
Unfolding after the Gülhane, The Islahat Ferman of 1856 proclaimed 
“Ottoman subjects of all religions eligible for official appointment according to 
their ability and opened civil and military schools to non-Muslims”37. The 
principles on which it was based had two noteworthy effects: if class circulation 
was possible, the non-elite as well as the non-governing elite had (at least in 
theory) the possibility to join the governing elite, defined as the sum of 
individuals „who wear labels appropriate to political offices of a certain 
altitude”38; not only class circulation was now possible vertically, the Gülhane 
decree introduced horizontal class circulation in the center of the Empire, by 
ensuring equality among subjects from different religious communities39. 
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On the other side, Ali established structurally the Cabinet and Advisory 
Council; ministers were all dismissed and appointed by Ali personally and major 
decisions were made by the ruler himself:” the Advisory Council, which was 
composed of government officials, religious scholars, noblemen, gentry and other 
personalities, only met once a year to review proposals”40. Thus, in his fight for 
consolidating power, Ali deepened the gap between the civil society and the state, 
by constructing a highly oligarchic system.Ali’s dictatorship and expansionism and 
the containment and besiege by the European powers from outside Egypt drowned 
reforms and impeded the development of political elites. Springing from the failed 
attempts to modernization and because of the lack of class circulation, the Urabi 
Revolution (1881-82) was an outburst aiming to build a bridge between the civil 
society and the state. Soon after the 1876 bankruptcy of Egypt that forced Khedive 
Isma'il (1863-1879) to the British and French Dual Control in his Government, 
Colonel Ahmed Urabi started gathering support for a nationalist movement aiming 
to “roll back Anglo-French financial and political predominance, the Turco-
Circassian monopoly on high military posts, and the authority of the Khedive”41. 
Khedive Tawfiq (1879-1892) was supported by the Europeans and his 
oligarchy: Muhammad Sharif's clique of wealthy Turco-Circassian "constitutionalists", 
liberal Syrian Christian journalists, parliamentary deputies who were also great 
provincial landlords or wealthy merchants, and some indigenous officials and 
ulama. On the other side of the cleavage were indigenous Egyptian army 
officers, some provincial landlords and parliamentary deputies and village 
shaykhs. However, the rebellion of domestic elites was ended in 1882 by the 
British occupation of Egypt, which engrained the rulers - ruled dichotomy as 
foreign – local. Furthermore, the end of the revolution witnessed some of the 
richest indigenous landowners and merchants welcoming General Garnet 
Wolseley to Cairo, cancelling any path towards elite autonomy and sharpening 
the cleavage, as the Ali dynasty survived at an ultimately fatal price in legitimacy and 
power: “after the catastrophe of 1882, it remained for the revolutionaries of 
1919 and 1952 to take up again the cause of Egypt for the Egyptians”42. 
As the struggle of the Great Powers to control Egypt ended, Egypt kept 
departing from Ottoman influence, now ruled by a small group of British 
military-backed Europeans. In December 1882 Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed 
to raise a new Egyptian army under British officers. Political reform was 
instrumentalized to serve British interests, wearing the guise of democratic 
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practice: the Khedival system was retained, together with the annual tribute to 
the Ottoman Sultan, while an influx of British officials seemed to supplant 
Egyptian bureaucracy. British advisors were appointed to the principal 
ministries, British advice was expected to be followed and administrative 
control tightened around claims of efficiency – political and financial stability 
were necessary, so the British would consider evacuation.  
Beginning with 1923, European constitutionalism was introduced in Egypt; 
however, the lack of an indigenous politically strong bourgeoisie and the excessive 
powers of the British controlled monarchy represented a limited form of self-
government: “for thirty years, King Ahmad Fu'ad and his son Faruq subverted the 
constitutional process and opposed the nationalist movement [and] as a result, while 
Egypt exhibited the structure of western-style constitutionalism, its practice was 
regularly compromised by the palace and its appointed ministers”43..Despite a 
multiplicity of political parties, elections, parliamentary sessions, and freedom of 
the press and associations, the constitution was repeatedly ignored, suspended, and 
even at times altered, while no political organization successfully exercised a brake 
on the dominance of the king. 
 
 
Institutionalizing Ideological Cleavage 
 
Panebianco’s institutionalization dilemma 
 
Angelo Panebianco identifies two dimensions of party 
institutionalization, which he considers to be positively correlated: autonomy 
and systemness. In his terms, the degree of institutionalization of a party should 
be measured by the degree of autonomy towards the entity’s environment and 
the degree of independence of its different internal sectors (systemness). If the 
state/the governing entity is considered a body aiming to improve its position 
relative to others, then one can define (1) autonomy as the degree of 
dependency on foreign inputs and (2) systemness as degree of dependency on 
domestic inputs. In the light of this reasoning, Kumbaracibasi’s correlation 
could explain the variation of the ideological orientation of the governing, by 
assuming that (a) Islamism increases popular support and foreign hostility and 
(b) secularism decreases popular support and foreign hostility.   
In the case of the Ottoman Empire, Panebianco’s strategic dilemma was 
determined by both variables: due to the entity’s sovereign nature, the latter had 
the capacity to compete in the world system, processing inputs both from 
foreign and domestic actors as to maintain the status-quo; hence, Abdülhamid 
was compelled to moderate his ideology in order to balance the two: reforms 
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that would concomitantly strengthen relations with constituents and maintain 
non-belligerent relations with the Great Powers. On the other hand, by relying 
exclusively on maintaining the monopoly on the use of force, the post 1882 
Khedivate only processed foreign inputs which determined its secular nature 
and its lack of moderation (Figure 4).   
If in the international arena Abdülhamid's re-Islamisation approach has 
been received with hostility by Europeans, the intricate domestic circumstances 
that reinforced his anxieties concerning his political fragility augmented his 
vulnerability to foreign pressures: “far greater danger to his reign came in the 
form of the war with Russia during the years of 1877-1878. This conflict was 
devastating for the Ottoman Empire and instrumental in shaping the subsequent 
course of the Hamidian era”44. The Sultan’s policies were subject of pressures 
both from below – the revolts that broke against tax collectors and the emotive 
nature of the revolts’ religious and national implications, and from above – 
Abdülhamid's constitutional attempts aiming to diminish the need for European 
involvement in Ottoman affairs, by ensuring a passive reception of western 
influence. The Ottoman Constitution of 1876, promulgated by the Sultan acting 
under the pressure of a small group of reformist bureaucrats was prepared not 
by a representative constituent assembly, but by a special committee appointed 
by the Sultan himself. The committee was composed of a total of 28 members, 
including two members of the military establishment, 16 civilian bureaucrats (of 
whom three were Christians), and 10 religious scholars (Ulema). Within the 
committee, the reformers headed by the Prime Minister Midhat Pasa were a 
minority. Therefore, the final text reflected a compromise between the 
reformers and the conservatives supported by the Sultan. Although the 
Constitution fell short of establishing a parliamentary monarchy, the monarch’s 
role was restricted essentially to ceremonial and symbolic matters. 
Nevertheless, even this limited experience in constitutional government proved 
too much for Abdülhamid, who prorogued the Chamber of Deputies indefinitely 
in 1878 and returned to absolutist rule for 30 years. The influence of Western 
liberalism, however, continued and expanded under his authoritarian rule. 
 
 
Vertical periphery 
 
The ideology of the governing dictated the nature of the “critical 
junctures determining subsequent political development and leading to long-
term alignments between social groups”45; by influencing the development of 
the conflict structure and its translation into politics, largely the latter could be 
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considered to have shaped political cleavages in the two political systems.  
Building on the work of Stein Rokkan, Bartolini and Mair conceptualize 
political cleavage as a dichotomy comprising a social structural element, an 
element of collective identity and an organizational manifestation in the form of 
collective action. In other words, “a structural division is transformed into a 
cleavage if a political actor gives coherence and organized political expression 
to what otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs”46.Furthermore, in their 
study of Stein Rokkan’s theory, Flora, Kuhlne and Urwin argue that analysis of 
political systems should start from a notion of territory, introducing a distinction 
between ‘centers’ and ‘peripheries’. However, the concept of periphery treated 
exclusively in geographic terms refers only to the horizontal dimension of 
peripherality; whereas if the space is defined as “the totality of a system of 
interaction, within which the center consists a of a key set of decision-makers, 
while the periphery is composed of those sets of participants in this system who 
have the least influence”47, then the concept of peripherality gains a vertical 
dimension.  
Thus, if the emergent state was a partaker instead of a regulator, then 
the first form of cleavage would spring vertically, in the framework of foreign 
versus domestic dichotomy, as “social change in the region has been throughout 
history the result of the interplay between indigenous and exogenous forces”48. 
In the case of Egypt, the dichotomy translated into a cleavage between the rulers 
and the ruled, since foreign pressures penetrated the political formation (Figure 
5): to tighten the grip on power, the rulers of Egypt responded to these pressures 
by exclusively representing the interests of foreign actors instead of their 
constituents, truncating the future of political representation. Witnessing the 
replacement of its local elites via the British intervention and the coercive 
European-imposed secularism, Egypt remained a province of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the dynasty founded by Muhammad 'Ali continued to rule, 
imposing “sniping deft and stiff-necked management in Cairo”49. If as a 
province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was a periphery50 in political and 
economic terms, after the British occupation unfolded, secularization brought 
about cultural exclusion, facilitating the emergence and radicalization of anti-
Western opposition.  
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On the other side, even during his authoritarian rule, Sultan 
Abdülhamid saw the need to develop a strategic plan to cope with the threats of 
the Great Powers, since, as argued by Rokkan, “success and failures of different 
modes of expansion also determine the internal structures of political systems”51 
(Figure 6). Loyalty and manpower were needed to achieve a sound, practical 
basis of social solidarity among the majority of his subjects: producing civil 
servants who were both capable and  loyal was a major preoccupation for the 
Hamidian government – in the early 1880s the Tanzimat reforms were extended 
to an empire-wide education system; despite his promotion of Islamic policy, 
the Sultan did not direct educational changes through religious hierarchy and 
established a parallel system through the French inspired Public Education 
Regulation of 1869. Still, the Imperial tradition and Islamic morality “naturally 
played a heavy role as the state attempted to use education to cement loyalty 
and affinity in its young subjects”52. 
The position of the cleavage was to determine the ideology of the 
radicalizing opposition: if in the case of Egypt, reactionary radicalism took the 
form of Islamism, in the case of future Turkey, radicalism emerged in a secular 
form: as pan-Islamism became mainstream through the educational system, a 
particular group that emerged as the Young Turks opposition movement was to 
shape the look of radical opposition. Two conclusions derive from the current 
analysis of cleavage development patterns. Firstly, Caramani’s assumption that 
the processes of state formation and external boundary building have been 
crucial in structuring political cleavage, applies to the current comparison. 
Secondly, if past cleavage structures do reflect upon the structure of 
contemporary party systems as expressed by Rokkan’s “freezing hypothesis”, 
then the nature of contemporary political systems in the region is somewhat 
dependent on the caucus era of political parties. 
 
 
Translating segmental cleavages: political parties  
 
Since “political parties are the principal institutional means for 
translating segmental cleavages into the political realm”53 and “the term ‘party’ 
also applies to conspiratorial groups aiming at the violent overthrow of existing 
regimes”54, the following chapter intends to compare two groups that emerged 
and radicalized in opposition within the two analyzed systems: the Society of 
the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
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Definitions of political parties are various and treat numerous 
dimensions. For Burke, a political party is “an organized assembly of men, 
united for working together for the national interest, according to the principle 
they agreed upon”55. For Gunther and Diamond, “parties are channels of 
intermediation between political elites and voters”56. For Schumpeter, “a party 
is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle 
for political power”57. In Aron’s terms, “political parties are voluntary groups, 
pretending, in name of a certain concept of common interest and society, to 
assume alone or in a coalition the functions of government58.  
Based on Weiner and LaPalombara’s assumption that parties rise “in 
the midst of great historical developments which affected them and which in 
turn were affected by them”59, the comparison will look at the (1) organizational 
and (2) ideological dimensions of the two groups.  
The CUP and the MB are treated as mass parties in accordance to 
Gunther and Diamond’s definition and as externally created parties, in 
Duverger’s terms: both had “the self-conscious determination of leaders at both 
national and local levels to capture and to hold decision-making power alone or 
in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power”60; both 
were characterized by a large base of members who remained permanently 
active in party affairs during non-electoral periods; in an effort to disseminate 
the party’s ideology and establish an active membership base, both sought to 
penetrate into a number of spheres of social life and had extensive arrays of 
supportive organizations; they emerged outside the Legislative, involved a 
challenge to the ruling group and a demand for representation and 
modernization, had a strongly articulated ideology and a nationalistic or an anti-
colonial rhetoric, while posing discipline among its adherents and 
aggressiveness in making demands on the system. 
 
 
Organization 
 
The CUP and the MB manifested permanent organization at the local 
level, with regularized communications and relationships between units. The 
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General Congress of the CUP constituted the decision-making body of the 
organization, met annually and was composed of members of the Central 
Committee, deputies and senators, representatives of the local organizations and 
clubs, general inspectors, and editors of the Committee’s official publications; it 
revised organizational regulations and appointed the Central Committee 
members - “a secretive board of 7 to 12 and individuals, which issued directives to 
the formal institutions of state: the cabinet, the military and the bureaucracy”61. 
In 1930 the first regulations to govern the operation of the MB came 
into existence.  The organizational hierarchy of the Society was based on the 
tripartite division between the General Guide, the General Guidance Council 
and the Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly held annual 
meetings and was composed of 100 to 150 members “endowed with morality, 
culture and practicality” 62. The General Guide was elected and could be 
removed by the Consultative Assembly at a meeting attended by no less than 
four-fifths of its members and a  majority. The General Guidance Council was 
formed of 12 to 15 members of the Consultative Assembly and elected by 
ballot, members holding office for 2 years. The MB had a Secretary General, a 
Treasurer, General Headquarters and six committees: policy, legal, statistics, 
services and legal opinions.  
Both the CUP and the Society sought in some manner popular support, 
aiming to “penetrate all spheres of society”63. The CUP formed two departments 
in this respect: a Provincial Organization Department and a Department of 
Clubs. A separate department coordinating activity in Istanbul retained its 
independence. The Central Committee presided over several Special Branches, 
which dealt with organizational matters in various sectors, such as women, the 
Ulema, provincial centers, local and district centers, and military and civil 
clubs. If at the dawn of the MB Hassan Al-Banna targeted the Ulama, the 
sheikhs of the Sufi orders, the leading families and the social and religious 
societies, by 1940 the organization had 10 sections concerned with ideology or 
indoctrination: propagation of the message, labour, peasants, family, students, 
liaison with the Islamic world, bodily training, professions, press and 
translations and the Muslim Sisters.  
 
 
Paramilitary Branches  
 
The Secret Apparatus (MB) and The Special Organization (CUP) 
undertook violent actions that aimed to protect the “beneficiaries” of their 
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ideologies. The CUP recruited army officers and assassins who swore to obey 
orders. As in the case of the MB, these activities initially occurred outside the 
borders of the targeted political formation: the Caucus and Russia in the case of 
the CUP and Palestine in the case of the MB64. In both cases, “secrecy was 
necessary to maintain the organizations’ solvency and assure its survival”65, the 
paramilitaries of the two becoming determinant for their ability to challenge 
political regimes.  
 
 
Welfare and Education: state versus party 
 
By the early 1880s, Abdülhamid focused on implementing the plans for 
an empire-wide education system and increasingly treated his subjects as 
citizens (in the legal, medical, fiscal, military and census-taking fields). While 
the inspiration of the education system was foreign, Abdülhamid made efforts 
to make it consonant with Ottoman and Islamic traditions. In reaction, “Young 
Turk students organized secret gatherings where [secular] illegal publications 
would be read collectively”66.  
I in the case of Egypt, the failure of the state to provide proper secular 
education gave the opportunity to the MB to support Islamic education and 
establish a Section of Welfare and Social Services, which extended in two years 
to over 500 branches. While invoking Islamic values, the MB attracted support 
from “the poor and the marginalized middle class [by] performing a wide range 
of social welfare functions which aided in recruiting and solidifying the loyalty 
of the members”67. The significant discrepancy between the two systems can be 
seen in the numeracy estimates of the populations (Figure 7). 
 
Ideology  
 
Although criticized by numerous behaviorists for her “world-
historically available model”68, the current analysis is based on Theda Skocpol’s 
non-voluntarist perception, where ideology is regarded as an anonymous, 
collective and transformable entity that is a direct result of the circumstances 
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created by the system the party emerges in; similarly, Aron and Schumpeter 
interpret ideology as the anthem of political imposition. Therefore, the Marxist 
approach to the definition of political parties, namely considering them the 
organization of the most conscious elements of a social class is applicable, if 
extrapolating from the concept of social class to any group of individuals that 
share a common restraint given as a result of their position within the system, 
and who believe in a common solution for improving their position in relation 
to other actors in society or the society in a holistic perspective. Hence, 
ideology occurs as an accident of historical circumstances only to inevitably 
become a tool and will be accounted in this comparison to underline its 
coincidental nature. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the cleavage manifesting both in 
Egyptian and Turkish identity emerged between the modernists and the Islamic 
revivalists. The modernists argued that renaissance was possible only through 
embracing western values and benefitting from their social, cultural and political 
products, proposing secularization. Islamic revivalists, on the other hand, argued 
that western technological advancements could be congruent with Islamic 
values and stop the decline of the Empire or liberate Egypt from foreign occupation. 
Although their political formulas69 differed, the MB resting on 
supernatural beliefs and the CUP upon concepts which appeared to be rational, 
both used the notions of popular sovereignty and tyrannicide to justify their 
legitimacy through “placing limitation on the authority of kings”70as efforts to 
restrict autocratic regimes and to save the electorate from “religious, cultural, 
political, economic, social, legal and moral decadence and impotence”71. Furthermore, 
both affected “the course of history among the peoples in the Middle East and 
[...] were the first to approach the social, political and cultural transformation of 
their society”72. The CUP’s manifesto of July 3rd, 1908 to the authorities of Ohri 
clearly stated that “the reason for insurrection was to combat the injustices and 
inequities that the fatherland has been suffering for many years”73.   
The CUP and the MB where rigid and exclusive, constituting “well-
defined social groups, membership in which is bound up in all aspects of the 
individual’s life”74. The CUP aimed to restore the constitution of 187675, 
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becoming itself a link in the historical chain of Ottoman bureaucratic 
westernization76, which was considered an easy mission for Ottomans: “not only 
the civilized Ottoman, but even the ordinary Muslim peasant who resided 
within the borders of the Sublime State was more competent than the cleverest 
European”77. Although also founded “to pursue a broad reform agenda”78, the 
MB’s “arrogation to itself of the exclusive authority to interpret God’s will gave 
its ideology a coercive tone”79.  
The CUP reunited various factions that were generically referred to as the 
Young Turks. The name of Committee of Union and Progress, became official 
during a reunion of the Behaeddin Shakir faction in 1906. By the 1902 CUP Paris 
Congress, clashes among the internal factions of the CUP materialized in the shape 
of Ottomanism80 versus Turkishness - where the latter was to prevail. 
Ahmed Riza81, one of the lead proponents of the creation of the Turkish 
nation-state, advocated in the Meşveret periodical for centralization and 
limitation of separatism. Influenced by positivist, Darwinist and atheist ideas, 
Riza believed “Turkey was the Japan of the Near East”82. Absorbed specifically 
by the way in which the Japanese had been able to adopt western science and 
technology without losing their spiritual core, the CUP replaced religion with 
science: “an educated man needs to know nothing other than science and 
technology; science has reached such a level that all things are knowable”83. 
The CUP was made up of “political reformers and ardent nationalists of the late 
                                                                                                                       
Revolution overthrew the Hamidian regime under the slogan of „Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity and Justice‟, aiming for a secular parliamentary democracy.  
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”84, whom adopted and adapted85 social 
Darwinism. 
Emerging after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the MB considered that 
the British occupation wrecked the Islamic state. Muslims failed their role of 
preserving the ideals and goals of Islam due to their weakness in fighting the 
western values, which were “responsible for all societal ills”86 and demanded 
“an end to party rivalry, and a channeling of the political forces of the nation 
into a common front and single phalanx”87, which would promote the Truth and 
Revelation of Prophet Muhammad. For the MB, there was “little or no room for 
conflicting interpretations of the religious norms and scriptures that serve as the 
basis of the party’s program and of laws which it seeks to impose on all of 
society”88. 
 
* 
 
Several conclusions must be drawn from the comparison: firstly, the 
paramilitary branches, the secret nature of the organizations (or parts of them) 
and their use of violence derived from the oppressive nature of the two political 
systems. Secondly, the westernization of the actors leading the central 
administration of the Empire was led by non-Muslims and followed by 
Muslims; as a result, the Turkish Ulema, due to its close adherence to the 
establishment, was unable to produce ideologies that challenged the 
westernization movement, leaving the effervescent public discontent with no 
strong Islamic guiding ideology. Thirdly, the role played by educational reform 
in the development of elites on one side of the cleavage or the other is directly 
dependent on the ideological orientation of the entity providing it – if an 
oppressive regime lays the basis for extensive, large-scale education, inevitably 
such developments will foster the emergence of opposition. On the other side, if 
the state fails to deliver such services, organizations in opposition will substitute 
such services, gaining popular support and strengthening opposition.  
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Although Egyptian intellectuals such as Hasan Attar, al-Jabarti and 
Rifa’ah Raifi’al Tahtawi had an initial response to western culture that was 
identical to that of Ottoman intellectuals in the capital of the Empire, “Egypt‘s 
political culture suffered from the consequences of restricted democratic 
practice, and constitutionalism was undermined by politicians who ruled 
according to their own arbitrary standards.”89 As Hanioglu illustrates, the causes 
of this divergent development as dependent upon the historical context: in 
contrast to Egypt, “Ottoman statesmen held their Empire to be geographically 
European and believed that their destiny lay with Europe”90. Therefore, the 
ideological resistance to Europeanization was not as strong as in Egypt, since 
westernization was seen as a tool serving the saving of the Empire, not as the 
materialization of its enemy. 
In this context, however, neither the CUP nor the MB could connect the civil 
society to the state.  Consequently, as stressed by Arend Lijphart, the more a 
party aiming to participate in governing is forced outside the political system, 
the more it resorts to alternative means of generating outputs, transforming 
oppression into radicalization. On the opposite side, the process could be 
reversed if the group can take part in exercising power, its behavior and position 
within the system becoming self-regulating. Amongst Lijphart’s models, the 
two-party system model is dominated by a dichotomy between two large parties 
which differ mainly on socio-economic issues, represented in Figure 8.                                                 
By replacing the Left-Right dichotomy with the modernists - Islamic 
revivalists’ cleavage, the rationale applies to the context of Turkish and 
Egyptian elites; the number of voters is replaced with number of subjects; the 
dotted line represents the relative number of subjects adhering to an ideology. If 
combining Hanioglu’s observations and Lijphart adapted theory, in the Ottoman 
case the floating subjects were a volatile mass that had access to power or the 
administrative apparatus, due to the sovereign nature of the political system 
(Figure 9).  In the case of Egypt, the space covered by floating subjects 
represents the core of the cleavage: since Islamists were forced outside of the 
political arena by the European domination and had no opportunity to cooperate 
with the secular actors, the Islamic revivalist elites were secluded into 
radicalization (Figure 10). By applying the concept of peripheliaty to Lijphart 
two-party systems, the graphic representation of the latter could be interpreted 
both horizontally and vertically, both cases becoming the exemplification of the 
structuralist explanation put forward in the previous chapters. If the first form of 
cleavage in the two political formations sprung vertically, then the two-party 
system model contextualized as the structural representation of the prevailing 
ideological cleavage sheds light on the causes of the divergent ideological 
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development of the CUP and the MB:  the ideology standing as basis for 
radicalism was a result of the configuration of the political system, depending 
on which group was governing and which group represented peripheral opposition. 
If the most abrupt ideological cleavage manifested in the case of 
Abdülhamid’s double dilemma occurred between the political system 
(encompassing the Sultan, the governing and non-governing elites and the civil 
society) and the interests of the Great Powers, in the case of Egypt the dominant 
cleavage occurred between the civil society and the political formation, which 
became synonymous with the local versus foreign dichotomy. 
  Bringing about a void between the rulers and the ruled, “the evenly 
matched contest between indigenous and foreign political focus generally had a 
disruptive effect on the integration of the political process”91. The dynasty, the 
governing elites and foreign interests were merging into the structure of the 
state, while local manifestations of political participation were forced to operate 
exclusively within the civil society if they had non-secular ideologies. As a 
result, the variation of the ideological orientation of the governing, determined 
the ideological nature of opposition, in a negative correlation: if Hamidian 
authoritarianism was Islamic revivalist, then radical opposition was secular; if 
the European-controlled authoritarian system was secular, then radical 
opposition was Islamic.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The limitations of each political system resulted into the radicalization 
of the MB and the CUP, which were “inevitably constrained by the strategic 
imperatives imposed by the system of competition in which they operated”92. 
Authoritarianism prevented their institutionalization and determined their 
radicalization. However, in both cases, the rejection of the regime (as the voice 
of secularization or re-Islamization) expressed “democracy-compatible” 
patterns93, illustrating a persistent fallacy in understanding the patterns of 
contemporary political participation attempts in MENA: inclusive participation 
and democratization are not synonymous with secularization. 
The constraints imposed by the political system upon party 
development were directly linked to the position of the first predominant 
ideological cleavage, which was determined by the degree of penetration of 
foreign pressures into domestic politics. In the case of the future Turkish 
system, all major reforms of the XIXth century could be accounted as reactions 
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to the decline of the Empire. The necessity of strategic diplomatic 
representation triggered elite modernization and provided them the opportunity 
to acquire autonomy. Although Abdülhamid’s regime was authoritarian, it had 
to provide a certain degree of class circulation at the cost of ideology, which 
gave the possibility of marginal elites to start the process of becoming a part of 
the governing machine. While in future Turkey governing elites were more 
diverse and on the road towards autonomy, Egypt witnessed the removal of 
local elites from the institutions in charge with the exercise of political power. 
Consequently, the incapacity of the Egyptian state to conduct its own 
foreign policy impeded elite modernization and circulation between governing and 
non-governing elites. Nevertheless, the Ali dynasty’s failed attempts to 
modernization created the opportunity for the opposition to mobilize and substitute 
the functions of the state, facilitating the process of gaining faithful adherents: the 
MB would come to “resemble a state with its armies, hospitals, schools, factories 
and companies”94.  On the other side, the more successful Western inspired 
Hamidian educational reforms gave birth to a new class of elites that responded in 
ideological opposition to authoritarianism, via radical secularism. 
In this context, both the CUP and the MB emerged as mass parties with 
a large base of permanently active members, robust and well-organized 
structure and extensive supportive (local) organizations between which 
regularized ties and communication existed. Both sought to penetrate various 
spheres of social life, developed paramilitary branches which functioned in 
secrecy and were influenced by the nature and provider of education. Both were 
determined to capture power, resorting to aggressive means for making 
demands on the system.  Furthermore, the MB and the CUP had strongly 
articulated ideologies which were rigid, exclusive and based on notions of 
popular sovereignty and tyrannicide. Although both groups’ ideologies took the 
guise of a panacea for all societal ills, the CUP’s weltanschauung derived from 
social-Darwinism and nationalism, whereas the MB’s ideas were the 
continuation of the Islamic faith.  
Therefore, if the significant distinction between the CUP and MB 
manifested at the core of their ideologies and their ideologies developed in 
opposition to the state, then radicalization is not determined by ideology, but a 
result of the socio-political processes triggered by the system in which the 
groups operate.The incapacity of the CUP and the MB to institutionalize was a 
consequence of oppressive authoritarianism - both became de jure political 
actors as soon as the opportunity occurred.  After the 1908 revolution, the CUP 
became a mass party, which grew and became increasingly institutionalized, 
although its “power could not be rendered legitimate and participatory”95. 
Similarly, after attempting to participate in party politics prior to the 1952 
revolution and managing to be marginally and unofficially a part of the political 
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system during the Egyptian military regimes, the MB became fully 
institutionalized in 2011 - on April 30, 2011 a new political party emerged in 
the Egyptian political arena: “the popular Islamic movement long banned from 
politics, announced that it has formed a political party”96. 
Furthermore, both groups faced the necessity to topple a regime to 
institutionally enter the input–output paradigm of the political system. The 
Hamidian regime was ultimately terminated at the convergence of domestic and 
foreign pressures and the CUP experimented power exercise and failure after 
the 1908 Revolution. On the other side, the lack of foreign pressures on the 
governing body of Egypt placed the Brotherhood in an impossibility to govern 
after the 1952 Revolution, freezing the political cleavage.  
If the case of the CUP reconfirmed that gaining power via revolutionary 
means does not bring about ideological moderation, the case of the MB 
indicated that stiff oppression does not either. The only path left to 
deradicalization and inclusion is the institutionalization of actors in opposition, 
which would provide them an opportunity to create outputs in accordance to 
their ideology, without having a monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, if 
such groups would gain power by winning elections and govern, the 
institutionalization dilemma would move to the international arena if the group 
would have an ideology situated at the periphery of the world system.  
However, to make such a scenario possible, radical opposition should 
assimilate both formally and informally the rules of democratic competition. 
Islamist groups have been secluded in the international arena, oppressed in the 
domestic one and most of their democratic experiences proved that “formal 
rules about how political institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides 
to what actually happens”97. If the Arab Spring could have been a momentum 
for fructifying the succession of a set of indigenous upheavals, it only affirmed 
a new missed opportunity. As the political formula of “western values” is 
proving to recoil at home, Western powers seemed to have returned to their 
ventriloquist practices in MENA. Forty years after Edward Said published his 
groundbreaking Orientalism, we are still struggling to disentangle the “profound 
difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and 
humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes 
of control and external enlargement of horizons.”98 
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Annexes 
 
Fig. 1, 2, 3. The position of the political party in relation to the state and the civil society99 
 
 
Fig. 4. Variation of Ideological Orientation of the Governing100 
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Fig. 1. Parties of the cadre or caucus type  
Fig. 2. Mass parties act as links between state and civil society 
 
Fig. 3. Mass parties act as links between state and civil society  
(Katz and Mair, op.cit., p.10-13) 
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Fig.5. The Urabi Revolution101    Fig. 6.  The Hamidian regime102 
 
 
Fig. 7. Numeracy estimates in percent 1820- 1920 (Data refers to birth decadal average)103 
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  Author’s own diagram. 
102
  Author’s own diagram. 
103
  Data Source: The Clio Infra Project. 
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Fig. 8. Lijphart’s majoritarian model104 
 
 
Fig. 9. Lijphart’s theory applied to Turkish elites 105 
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Fig. 10. Lijphart’s theory applied to Egyptian Elites106 
 
                                                 
106
 Author’s own diagram. 
